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The English wordontology, together with its counterparts in many languages,
has made a breathtaking career during the last decades especially in informa-
tion science, but also in other disciplines. Since its definitions vary consider-
ably within and especially across disciplines, and since this volume, although
clearly focused on linguistic matters, is conceived as tying together several
disciplines, it seems appropriate to provide a short survey of these uses in
order to make the different contributions and their interconnections more ac-
cessible for those readers who are not familiar with all the fields that are
represented between the covers of this book (presumably the majority).
1. Readings of ontology: Carving up a conceptual space
1.1. The major dimensions of variation
The traditional notion of ontology has a long and venerable history in phi-
losophy. The most usual word for it, however, the compound built from the
Greek forms onto- ‘of being’ and logos ‘speech, reason’ in the guise of its
later derivative logia ‘science’, is a comparatively recent invention. It seems
to have originated in the context of the early Enlightenment, since its first
attested appearance in print is in 1606 on the front page of the textbook Og-
doas Scholastica (‘Scholastic Eightfold’) by Jacob Lorhard,1 and it became
popular about one century later when Christian Wolff used it in the title of
his 1729 book Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia (First Philosophy or Ontol-
ogy). There, Wolff gives the following definition: Ontologia seu Philosophia
Prima est scientia entis in genere, seu quatenus ens est (Ontology or First
Philosophy is the science of Being in general or as Being).
But the study of Being as Being goes back at least to Aristotle’s Meta-
physics. To quote the philosopher Nino Cocchiarella:
Aristotle was the founder not only of logic in western philosophy, but of on-
tology as well, which he described in his Metaphysics and the Categories as
2 Matthias Nickles et al.
a study of the common properties of all entities, and of the categorial aspects
into which they can be analyzed. The principal method of ontology has been
one or another form of categorial analysis, depending on whether the analysis
was directed upon the structure of reality, as in Aristotle’s case, or upon the
structure of thought and reason, as, e.g., in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.
(Cocchiarella 2001: 117)
Despite its conciseness this characterization already makes it possible to
distinguish two dimensions of variation along which notions of ontology vary.
One is opened up by the common properties of all entities on the one hand
(being as being) and their categorial aspects on the other (categories and kinds
of entities), let us call this the dimension of generality (as opposed to speci-
ficity). The other one is opened up by the distinction between external reality
and the contents of thought and reason. Let us call this the dimension of ob-
jectivity (as opposed to subjectivity). Since the two are orthogonal, we can
imagine them as spanning a vertical plane where generality extends from its
maximum at the top through increasing degrees of specificity to the lower
bound of generality at the bottom, and where objectivity extends in the depth
with its maximum at the foreground and increasing degrees of subjectivity
towards the back (cf. Figure 1).
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Figure 1. The generality-objectivity plane.
So when the Dictionary of Philosophical Terms and Names de-
fines ontology as “Branch of metaphysics concerned with identifying,
in the most general terms, the kinds of things that actually exist”,
(http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/o.htm#onty) we can say that this no-
tion of ontology places it close to the upper foreground in our picture. Sim-
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ilarly when ontology is variously described as being concerned with the ul-
timate furniture, or the basic furniture or simply the furniture of the world,
this corresponds to increasingly large regions on our plane from the top to the
bottom. And when Aristotle is concerned more with the structure of reality it-
self, this notion of ontology is located in the foreground of our plane, whereas
Berkeley’s ([1710] 1999: §6) idealist view that All the choir of heaven and
furniture of the earth . . . have not any subsistence without a mind has its
place considerably further back.
But how does this relate to Gruber’s often-quoted definition of ontology
for the purposes of Artificial Intelligence2 as “an explicit specification of a
conceptualization,” where a “conceptualization is an abstract, simplified view
of the world that we wish to represent for some purpose” (Gruber 1993: 199)?
Is there a connection at all or is this a case of homonymy, an entirely unre-
lated different use of the same orthographical form? Gruber adds: “The term
is borrowed from philosophy, where an ontology is a systematic account of
Existence.” This is of course neither the notion of ontology we have just dis-
cussed (science of being as being; study of the common properties of all
entities; branch of metaphysics concerned with the kinds of things that exist)
nor something completely different, instead it is something closely related:
The concept coded by the mass noun (no article, no plural) is that of a field
of investigation, of a discipline (‘science’, ‘study’, ‘branch’), the concept ex-
pressed by the count noun (taking articles and plural form) is that of a specific
outcome of that kind of investigation (‘account’): Aristotle’s ontology, e.g., is
different from Kant’s, but both contribute to (the field of) Ontology. In order
to visualize the distinction we will use an uppercase initial for the name of
the field (domain of issues, etc.) – i.e. ‘Ontology’ – and a lowercase initial for
the different views that are produced in the field – i.e. ‘ontology’.
This kind of field-product polysemy is familiar from linguistics: Syntax
as a mass noun means a field, a certain branch of linguistics; its different
outcomes – like say Haider’s syntax of German (Haider 1993) – are coded
by the corresponding count noun. In fact, in linguistics there is a third use
of the term syntax (and a second use of the count noun), one that relates
to the subject matter of the second and first use, i.e., that subsystem of a
language that constrains the building of phrases from word forms. So there is
an object-level use of this term (syntax as language subsystem), a meta-level
use (syntax as theoretic account of this subsystem), and in a sense a trans-
meta-level use (syntax as subfield or branch of linguistics). Is there a similar
three-level distinction with ontology?
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level field
Generality
Objectivity
specific account purview
Figure 2. Conceptual space of the notion ontology
The answer is ‘yes’ and ‘no’. ‘Yes’ in the sense that of course there are
three levels as well: What there is and its categories (object-level), specific
accounts thereof (meta-level), and a field concerned with this subject matter
and therefore with the production and discussion of specific accounts of being
(yet another level). ‘No’ in the sense that only the last two levels are properly
called ontology, the second one by transparent metonymic extension (and
count noun formation) from the name for the third one, whereas the first one
requires different means of expression3 such as the real world (as opposed
to possible counterparts) or simply reality or rather its (ultimate or basic)
furniture.
Whether we include the object-level in this overview or not (and in fact we
should include it for the sake of being systematic), we now have introduced
a third dimension of variation and thus created a conceptual space where
variants and relatives of the notion ontology can be localized (cf. Figure 2):
The vertical dimension reflects generality with the most general matters at the
top; the depth dimension reflects objectivity with the most objectivist view at
the front; and the horizontal dimension has three segments with the world and
its aspects and parts at the right, the different accounts of it in the middle and
the field(s) of Ontology at the left.
Note that the horizontal relations between the three blocks are somewhat
heterogeneous because the field of Ontology is not located on a meta-level
with respect to the different ontologies in the same way the latter are on a
meta-level with respect to what they account for. That would be the level of a
metaontology, an ontological account of different object ontologies. The field
of Ontology is rather something that is concerned with being and its kinds by
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producing and discussing ontologies. Obviously, the present book is a product
of this (ever evolving) field, and what the present subsection tries to outline
is a clarification of different concepts that have come to be called ‘ontology’.
It is now time to come back to the second dimension of variation, objec-
tivity. The AI-reading of the notion of ontology mentioned above seems to
be rather clear in this respect: “An ontology is an explicit specification of a
conceptualization.” (Gruber 1993: 199) This points to a subjective notion of
ontology: Not reality per se is its object, but reality under a given conceptual-
ization. But the latter notion is explained by Gruber as follows: “conceptual-
ization: the objects, concepts, and other entities that are presumed to exist in
some area of interest and the relationships that hold [among] them” (Gruber
1993: 199). This is, to say the least, a little confusing: If your current area
of interest is your desktop and if you presume that an object exists there,
namely a pile of unread papers, is this object then part of a conceptualiza-
tion? Certainly not. Gruber must mean a conceptualization of this object. But
then what are the concepts that you presume to exist on your desktop? Prob-
ably there aren’t any, because wherever concepts exist, in Plato’s heaven or
in people’s minds, they certainly do not exist on desktops. On the other hand,
concepts fit much better in a conceptualization than objects. So the quoted
definition is not very helpful, and we wouldn’t have bothered mentioning it at
all if this kind of confusion of object- and meta-level didn’t seem to be quite
widespread in the field.4
What Gruber must mean by conceptualization of a given domain is a sys-
tem of concepts that adequately characterize everything that exists in that do-
main: individual concepts for individuals, property concepts for properties,
relation concepts for relations, second order concepts for first order concepts,
etc. But it is an open question whether these concepts are meant to be objec-
tive and the characterizations they provide are thought of as realistic (located
at the foreground of our conceptual space), or more to the back in the sense
of representing some other view. And maybe this is good as it is, because the
depth dimension of the conceptual space of ontologies is the most difficult
and philosophically most demanding one. It is to do with the independence
or interdependence of Ontology and Epistemology, with questions of realism
and opposing views, in short with the “most hotly debated issues in contem-
porary metaphysics” according to philosopher Alexander Miller (2005).
Then what is realism? “Realism is the thesis that the objects, properties
and relations the world contains exist independently of our thoughts about
them or our perceptions of them. Anti-realists either doubt or deny the exis-
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tence of the entities the realist believes in or else doubt or deny their inde-
pendence from our conceptions of them.” (Khlentzos 2004) Realism is rarely
held across the board, philosophers rather tend be realist about one domain
and non-realist about another. John Searle, for instance, in his recent paper
What is an institution? says:
[I]t is essential to distinguish between those features of the world that are
totally independent of human feelings and attitudes, observer independent
features, and those features of the world that exist only relative to human
attitudes. . . . It is important to see that one and the same entity can have both
observer independent features and observer dependent features, where the
observer dependent features depend on the attitudes of the people involved.
(Searle 2005: 3–4)
Searle’s aim in the paper just quoted from is “to explain how the ontology
of institutions fits into the more basic ontology of physics and chemistry”
(Searle 2005: 1) and the explanation he offers is the following:
[O]ne and the same phenomenon (object, organism, event, etc.) can satisfy
descriptions under which it is non-institutional (a piece of paper, a human
being, a series of movements) and descriptions under which it is institutional
(a twenty dollar bill, the president of the United States, a football game). An
object or other phenomenon is part of an institutional fact, under a certain
description of that object or phenomenon. (Searle 2005: 12)
For Searle an institutional fact is something that has been collectively as-
signed a status function, and since this collective assignment presupposes
some representation of it as having this function, institutions require (at least
some primitive form of) language.
Although Searle devotes one section of his paper to Language as the Fun-
damental Social Institution, he is mainly concerned there with showing that
language is a prerequisite for social institutions and not with discussing the
status of language as a social institution itself. The reason may be this: If
language were a social institution just as the others it would have to be a pre-
requisite of itself. The way out of this seeming circle is not hard to find: Each
higher form of language requires only some more primitive form of language
and so there is space for the evolution of language out of more primitive
forms of representation sharing. Therefore an extension of Searle’s (or some
similar) concept of an institution to include language as the fundamental in-
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stitution along these lines is consistent and will be taken for granted in the
following sections.5
Coming back to the definition of realism above (“the thesis that the ob-
jects, properties and relations the world contains exist independently of our
thoughts about them or our perceptions of them”) we now see that the devil
is in a certain detail, namely the reference of the possessive pronoun form
our. Here we have two options. If we read our to include any rational subject,
then we are forced to assume an at least partially non-realist position if we
assume (as we probably should) that the world contains among other things
institutions and institutional facts, since we have just subscribed to the view
that their existence depends on thoughts about and perceptions of them. If we
read it to include only the persons who are involved in the current reflection
process, then we can maintain a completely realist position which has the in-
teresting property of allowing two kinds of really existing phenomena, those
that exist independently of anyone’s thoughts or perceptions and those that
exist independently of our (in the narrow sense), but not independently of
others’ thoughts or perceptions.6 Human languages, being very fundamental
forms of institutions, are of the second kind.
Fortunately, in the context of the present volume the issue of realism and
its different opposing views does not really constitute a problem. Most of the
authors seem to be realists about the world, although there may be consider-
able disagreement with respect to the degree to which different views on this
world (alias ontologies) can diverge.7
1.2. Further dimensions of variation
Our short review of the depth dimension of the conceptual space that embeds
different notions of ontology has brought to the fore the importance of the
agents who have to do with ontologies (the plural makes it clear that the meta-
level concept is meant). Here at least two roles have to be distinguished: The
author of an ontology and its user. It is a trivial fact that they need not coin-
cide, but an especially compelling illustration of this fact is provided by Rolf
Pfeifer’s (2000) Didabots, simple robots for didactic purposes, who didn’t
author but use an ontology which consists of only three situation categories:
(a) no obstacle, (b) obstacle to the left, (c) obstacle to the right. Didabots have
wheels and sensors and an algorithm that, based on their ontology, lets them
avoid obstacles.8
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Whereas the user of an ontology can always be identified, its author may
well be unknown or even inexistent. Take Caenorhabditis elegans, the nema-
tode or roundworm that became famous among other things for its nervous
system which consists of only 302 neurons. One could say that the ontology
of C. elegans comprises at least the following categories and their comple-
ments: (a) increasing concentration of an attractant, (b) decreasing concen-
tration of a repellent, (c) increasing closeness to the preferred temperature.
This makes sense insofar as the behavior of this nematode is geared towards
situations of category (a), (b) and (c), and not their complements; the former
two forms of behavior are called chemotaxis, the latter thermotaxis. So if one
is ready to speak of the world view or ontology of a robot or a roundworm,
the identity of the user is clear, but in the latter case the identity of the au-
thor is problematic. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that oftentimes
ontologies have simply evolved, without any specific author available.
Alongside with the roles of the author and the user, the role of the object
or domain of an ontology (in the right-hand column of our conceptual space)
is of prime importance. It has already been shortly addressed in terms of the
horizontal dimension of variation of our conceptual space, so a short reminder
will suffice here. Ontologies vary with respect to their ‘aboutness’, i.e., what
they are ontologies of. This can be, with decreasing generality, (i) all possible
worlds, (ii) one world only, especially the one we live in (or seem to live in; cf.
the depth dimension), (iii) subdomains of this world (or others) of increasing
degrees of specificity. Is there an upper bound for the specificity in (iii)? In
other words: What is the minimum degree of generality that is required for an
ontology? Does it make sense to speak of the ontology of this nasty fly that
keeps circling your head as you are reading this?
We submit that the answer should be negative. There is something like the
ontology of C. elegans, or at least it is in the making,9 but this does not mean
that this ontology provides a systematic account in all relevant aspects of a
single exemplar of this species, but of all exemplars that come from the same
kind of genome. Similarly, it certainly makes sense to develop an ontology
not only of aircraft, but also one of aircraft accidents. But it does not make
sense to create an ontology of the Airbus A 340 crash at Toronto on August
2nd, 2005,10 at least not without another significant extension of the concept.
So far, even the most specific domain ontologies like the one of the famous
roundworm have a generic object. They are intrinsically intensional insofar
as they entail predictions about new entities that instantiate the generic en-
tity. Insofar, ontological knowledge about a domain is definitional knowledge
about it, not episodic knowledge about its states and fates.
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The last and certainly not least aspect of ontologies that has to be ad-
dressed in this overview is the evaluation aspect. If there are two competing
ontologies of the same domain, is it possible that one is true and the other
one false? Or are there other criteria for the evaluation of ontologies? If, as
we have assumed, ontologies in the simple meta-sense are conceptualizations,
then they themselves cannot be true or false, they can only be more or less ad-
equate and more or less useful. And of course they are completely inadequate
if they entail false statements. If for instance someone conceptualizes human
languages as being either red or green, this entails that English is either red
or green, which is false, because it involves a category mistake. Category
mistakes, especially less blunt ones, are a serious source for inadequacies in
ontologies.
But even if an ontology does not entail false statements it can still be
inadequate or less useful for various reasons. Usefulness is a relational con-
cept which requires a purpose. Of two competing ontologies one can be more
useful than the other for one purpose and less useful for another. Of two clas-
sifications of aircraft, e.g., one according to the kind of propulsion and the
other one according to the status of the owner, the first one will outrank the
latter in helpfulness when the purpose is spare parts, and the opposite will be
the case when the purpose is legal matters of air traffic.
The usefulness of adequate conceptualizations and hence ontologies is a
key issue in all scientific disciplines,11 but it is especially important in disci-
plines that involve evolutionary accounts, such as biology, and even more so
in fields where historical transfer plays a role, such as linguistics. Ontologies
for linguistics are the topic of the contributions by Farrar and Zaefferer to
this volume. Other aspects of the assessment of ontologies like provenance
and credibility are discussed in Section 2.4.2.4. below.
Here is a summary of the findings of this section. In its most general read-
ing, the article-less term Ontology, which lacks a proper plural, has turned
out to refer to a rather controversial and indeed puzzling subfield of philos-
ophy and more precisely of metaphysics. Thomas Hofweber, a philosopher
of language, metaphysics, and mathematics, speaks of a “puzzle about ontol-
ogy”, which he identifies as “the puzzle that there seem to be two contrary
but equally good answers to the question (Q) How hard is it to answer onto-
logical questions?”, namely “Answer I: Very hard” and “Answer II: Trivial.”
(Hofweber 2005: 259). Still, the definition of the philosophical discipline as
being concerned with “what entities make up reality” (Hofweber 2005: 256)
seems to be relatively uncontroversial.
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This is not the case with the notions the count noun ontology, with a proper
and frequently used plural, is used to encode. Ontologies in this sense, spe-
cific answers to the question of what entities there are, may – but need not –
be the outcome of philosophical endeavors, they may come from other disci-
plines as well or they may be no human artifacts at all, as in the case of the
ontology of a macaque monkey brain (Metzinger and Gallese this vol.). In
that third case the hardness question quoted above does not even arise (after
all, it is the author of an ontology who has to answer ontological questions)
and in the second case there is a clear tendency towards Answer II (author-
ing an aircraft spare parts ontology will rarely benefit from an ambition to
answer deep questions). With respect to ontologies from non-philosophical
disciplines, the controversy about the definition is mostly restricted to com-
puter science (cf. Sections 2.3. and 2.4. below). The reason has to do with the
prevailing conceptualization (or domain ontology) of language within that
field. In principle, answering the question of what there is in a given domain
may take any of various forms the outcome of a process of stocktaking may
take: term lists, thesauri, glossaries or what have you. According to the tra-
ditional view, the linguistic items in these data structures are but strings of
bytes and not full-fledged linguistic signs with form, structure, and content
(cf. Farrar this vol.). So computer scientists tend to emphasize that a real on-
tology has to be much more than a mere inventory of items, i.e. lists of strings
(cf. Section 2.3. below), and the controversy is mostly about what additional
ingredients are required for an enriched inventory to count as an ontology.
The fact that philosophers never have thought about this kind of intricacies
shows only that they always have taken the inferential potential of concepts
for granted, whereas in computer science it takes a whole machinery to get it
going.
We will conclude this section with Figure 3 that illustrates some of the
dimensions of variation we have presented above.
Figure 3 shows in the rows from top to bottom very general, more special
and very special variants of Ontology and ontologies, in the columns from
left to right (i) the corresponding fields, (ii) examples for specific cases of
accounting for what there is in a domain, and (iii) the purview or intended
domain of such a specific account, and in the depth from front to back realist-
objectivist and more idealist-subjectivist approaches. Not shown in the figure
are the following aspects of ontologies we have also addressed briefly above:
origin (author or evolutionary process), user, purpose and quality.
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ontology for
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Figure 3. Example of variation dimensionsand aspects of ontologies
2. Notions of ontology in different disciplines
2.1. Ontology and ontologies in other fields
Having carved up the conceptual space underlying the term ‘ontology’, we
will now turn to a discussion of notions of ontology in different disciplines.
This includes briefly touching on disciplines that are not directly relevant
with respect to linguistics and thus not in the focus of this volume. Following
this, we will concentrate on the disciplines and areas that are connected to the
ontolinguistics enterprise, specifically on linguistics, computer science, and
artificial intelligence.
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Ontological questions are metaphysical questions by definition, and ety-
mologically speaking the latter come after the physical questions, so they can
be turned back on physical issues. Contemporary theoretical physics is full
of ontological questions of the hard kind like the particle-wave duality, quan-
tum ontology or the ontological implications of string theory, so Ontology as
a discipline has interesting issues to deal with that come from physics. But
physicists do not seem to make much use of ontologies of their domain.
The situation is different with the other hard sciences. One of the most suc-
cessful ontologies of modern times seems to be the periodic table of elements
in chemistry. This can be regarded as a paradigm case of an ontology not
only because it is highly systematic and useful, but also for its predictiveness:
At least two elements, those with atomic numbers 117 and 118, are claimed
to exist, but have not yet been successfully attested. Another paradigmatic
feature of this ontology is that it is about natural kinds.
The same has been assumed for a long time for the species of biology. But
it turned out that although there is no doubt that there are different individual
species (species taxa as biologists call them) like Homo sapiens, our species,
or Canis familiaris, that of the domestic dog, it is doubtful, if taken together,
that the species form a natural kind or category because there is no criterion
that unites them to the exclusion of other taxa (interbreeding competes with
common ecological niche and phylogenetic unity, cf. Ereshevsky 2002). Nev-
ertheless, one of the domains that are currently characterized by an incredible
boom in ontologies is that of the live sciences. Bioinformatics and related ar-
eas are teeming with web services like Open Biomedical Ontologies (“an um-
brella web address for well-structured controlled vocabularies for shared use
across different biological and medical domains,” http://obo.sourceforge.net/)
or Gene Ontology (“a controlled vocabulary to describe gene and gene prod-
uct attributes in any organism,” http://www.geneontology.org/).
Since the social sciences are only starting to discuss ontological issues (cf.
our discussion of Searle’s contribution), it does not come as a surprise that
social ontologies are not considered to be very mature so far, with a notable
exception:
Legal systems are perhaps the most well-developed ontologies in the social
world. Most laws are categorizations of objects at some level and most legal
disputes turn on distinctions among categories. Because legal systems often
comprise the most well-developed ontologies of the social world, they are a
good reference for philosophers and social scientists seeking to study social
objects. (Koepsell 1999: 219)
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To conclude the general overview presented in this section, the increasing
use of ontologies in business applications, e.g., workflow ontologies, should
not remain unmentioned.
2.2. Notions of ontology in linguistics
Compared to other disciplines, contemporary linguistics assigns the term on-
tology a rather peripheral role in its domain. So far, only two subfields seem
to make systematic use of one or the other member of the family of concepts
coded by this term and a third one is just beginning to do so.
The younger one is that branch of computational linguistics that system-
atically takes advantage of ontologies in the AI sense of the term. One of the
most recent and most extensive outcomes of this field is the book Ontological
Semantics (Nirenburg and Raskin 2004). Its ontology lists the definitions of
concepts for describing the meanings of lexical items of natural languages,
but also for the specification of the meanings of the text-meaning represen-
tations that serve among others the function of an interlingua for machine
translation. Other intended applications are information extraction, question
answering, human-computer dialog systems, and text summarization.
The older linguistic domain that uses the term ontology is model-theoretic
formal semantics, which in one of its simplest guises uses the ontology of
first order logic: individuals, sets of tuples of individuals and truth values.
But progress in the semantic analysis of natural language made it soon ob-
vious that a less parsimonious ontology is required for this purpose and so
the number of ontological categories started to grow. To point out just a few
milestones: Montague (1973) added possible worlds and moments of time to
the basic ontology and projected from there, using a recursively defined set
of types, an infinite ontology of possible denotations; Link (1983) devised an
integrated ontology for individuals and substances by providing both with a
semilattice structure; Davidson’s (1967) proposal to grant events the status
of a basic ontological category has been welcomed and fruitfully employed
in linguistics, and Barwise and Perry’s idea (1983) of enriching the ontol-
ogy by admitting situations as ‘first-class citizens’ had a similar impact. In
short, many contributed to the task of freeing linguistic ontology from the
constraints of philosophical ontology. In the abovementioned paper, Gode-
hard Link advocated the view that “reductionist ontological considerations”
are “quite alien to the purpose of logically analyzing the inference structures
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of natural language” and went on to state the maxim: “Our guide in ontolog-
ical matters has to be language itself, it seems to me.” (Link 1983: 303–304)
In the same spirit Emmon Bach coined the term ‘Natural Language Meta-
physics’ (cf. Bach 1986; “. . . what I am doing here is not metaphysics per se
but natural language metaphysics,” Bach 1989: 98). He is also to be credited
with the most succinct characterization of the difference between the two:12
Whereas the philosopher is interested in answering question (1), the job of
the linguist is to find convincing answers to question (2):
(1) What kinds of things are there?
(2) What kinds of things do people talk as if there are?
We have called above the field that revolves around (1) Ontology, conse-
quently we will use the term Language Ontology (with two capital initials)
for the endeavors around (2), if language in general is concerned, and lan-
guage Ontology, e.g., Korean language Ontology, when the focus is on an
individual language.
It should be clear by now that the subject-matter of Language Ontology
does not concern only model-theoretic semantics (it simply becomes visible
there most clearly), but should interest every linguist who subscribes to the
view that linguistic signs associate perceivable forms with conceptual con-
tents, because these conceptual contents are never isolated in human language
users, but integrated into the way they conceptualize their world, their individ-
ual ontology. Individual ontologies contain one or more language ontologies,
but also something else which is often called commonsense ontology.
We submit that Commonsense Ontology, the study of commonsense on-
tologies, should be defined as being about answering the question (3):
(3) What kinds of things do agents behave as if there are?
There are two reasons for distinguishing Language Ontology from Common-
sense Ontology (and the same holds for their lower-case counterparts). The
first is that it makes sense to ascribe commonsense ontologies also to subjects
that do not have language (like robots, macaque brains, and roundworms),
and the second is that the question of the relation between the two is too
interesting to be begged by blunt stipulation of their identity. The pertinent
keyword is linguistic relativity and the challenge consists in factoring the
ontogenesis of individual ontologies into (a) the conceptual default settings
babies are born with, (b) the culturally induced development the conceptual
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system is subject to, and (c) the effects of the individual language on this
development. This points to another discipline that uses the term ontology,
not entirely within the confines of linguistics proper, but overlapping with it:
developmental cognitive science.
A look into the child development literature shows lively research activ-
ities in this field. Imai and Gentner, e.g., tested whether the distinction be-
tween object names and substance names is based on a pre-linguistic on-
tological distinction or is driven by language (Japanese and English). Their
results lead them to the following speculation:
Children begin learning word meanings building on their pre-linguistic onto-
logical knowledge about individuation. Language learning leads children to
pay attention to those aspects of the world that are habitually used in their own
language, and this influence begins very early. Finally, children’s sensitivity
to linguistically-relevant aspects of the world may come to extend beyond the
context of language use. (Imai and Gentner 1997: 196–197)
There is no doubt that language ontologies and commonsense ontologies
are closely related since every language ontology is “a conceptualization or
categorization of what normal everyday human language can talk about” (Za-
efferer 2002: 33–34) and this is largely determined by the requirements of
everyday life. In other words, both primarily contain concepts of entities en-
countered in everyday life (for an overview of what that could and should
comprise, cf. Zaefferer this vol.) and their relations. These are the concepts
for the expression of which natural languages tend to readily provide cod-
ings, be they simple or complex. Examples include concepts such as CAR or
RUN, the most compact codings of which in English are the noun car and
the verb run (more complex codings like motorized vehicle with wheels or go
faster than a walk are reserved for special purposes), and relations such as the
conceptual subordination of CAR under VEHICLE and of RUN under MOVE.
Systems for the representation of word semantics such as WordNet (Fellbaum
1998, cf. also Fellbaum this vol.) are based on sense relations and thus reflect
the underlying language ontology, since sense relations are relations between
words (in a reading) based on ontological relations between the concepts that
constitute the meanings of these words (in that reading).
Lexical semantics is not the only example of linguistic research that needs
to take the corresponding language ontology into account. Another case in
point is work on classifiers – be it in the context of classifier systems in dif-
ferent spoken languages (cf. again Imai and Gentner 1997 and Hellwig this
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vol.) or of classifier predicates in signed languages (Talmy this vol.). Here,
the underlying conceptual categorization of entities is responsible for the use
of different classifier morphemes or predicates.
A further example is the almost trivial observation that different word
classes tend to reflect different conceptualizations in that verbs usually code
eventities whereas non-derived nouns most often code ‘thing-like’ entities
(called ‘inventities’ in Zaefferer this vol., and ‘ineventities’ in Schalley 2004).
Based on this, adjectives code mostly characteristics or attributes of the latter,
whereas adverbs do the same for the former.
A fourth kind of linguistic studies where language ontology plays a role
is anaphora resolution. In a sentence like When you try to catch a lizard, the
reptile may drop the tail and escape both definite noun phrases are anaphor-
ically related to the indefinite a lizard, but the relationship is mediated by
ontological relations of different kinds (for the definitions compare Schalley
and Zaefferer this vol.): Since LIZARD is c-subordinated to REPTILE (every
lizard is a reptile), the reptile may have its antecedent in a lizard, and since
LIZARD is m-i-superordinated to TAIL (every complete lizard has a tail as in-
tegral part), the tail may be interpreted as including a possessor slot which
again has its antecedent in a lizard. Given the ontolinguistic framework the
former case could be called conceptual subanaphor and the latter meronomic
superanaphor.
Our final example showing the relevance of ontological knowledge for the
proper use of language is the grammar of coordination. A precondition for the
coordination of phrases as well as sentences is that the conjuncts are parallel
with respect to syntax, semantics, and prosody (Lang 1984), where semantic
parallelism is defined by two constraints: (a) the concepts coded by the coor-
dinated elements have to be semantically independent, i.e., neither of them is
c-subordinated to the other, and (b) there has to be a non-trivial subordinator,
a third concept that is c-superordinated to both. So my dog and my animal
and a walk and an integer are both semantically bad noun phrases, the first
for violating (a), since DOG is c-subordinated to ANIMAL, and the second
for violating (b), since the strongest common c-superordinate of WALK and
INTEGER is probably ENTITY and so it could not be more trivial.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section there is a third subfield of
linguistics that makes use of the term ontology or rather is just beginning to
do so. It is the field of foundations of linguistic theory together with the field
that deals with linguistic terminology. Whereas the former is concerned with
questions various other disciplines like philosophy of language and philoso-
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phy of science are also interested in, the latter has among other things to keep
pace with all the terminological innovations that keep growing in the different
schools of linguistics around the globe. And still they are united by a common
interest in what will be called ‘Ontology for linguistics’ (or ‘ontologies for
linguistics’) here in order to distinguish it from Language Ontology and its
kin. Continuing our strategy we will characterize also this field by its leading
question:
(4) What kinds of things linguists talk about are there?
Strictly speaking, since the study of linguistic terminology is about linguistic
metalanguage, a variation of leading question (2) above, characterizing Lan-
guage Ontology, would seem to be more adequate for this field, namely (5):
(5) What kinds of things do linguists talk as if there are?
However, given the scientific ambition of linguistics, a separate investiga-
tion of (5) without consideration of (4) will not be satisfactory. So the notion
‘ontology for linguistics’ refers to those conceptualizations of the domain
of language and languages that are used to ‘talk linguistics’, to express and
describe linguistic phenomena with the help of the corresponding concepts
and the relations between them. The linguistic codings of these concepts are
often, but by no means exclusively, technical terms of linguistics. Examples
for such concepts include WORD CLASS, SPEECH ACT or EVENTITY (coded,
e.g., in German linguistic terminology by the nouns Wortart, Sprechakt and
Eventita¨t, respectively), and CONCEPT (coded by the English word concept as
used in this chapter), but also relations such as the conceptual incompatibility
between ARTICLE and VERB (i.e., it is not conceivable that some linguistic
entity is both an article and a verb).
Interestingly, a certain ontology of linguistics is also part of natural lan-
guage ontology, since the codings of corresponding concepts such as SAY,
WORD or QUESTION are presumably part of every natural language (cf. also
Goddard this vol.; Zaefferer this vol.). Some of these concepts have a special
status in any language ontology as they are instantiated by linguistic signs,
which in turn have instantiations that refer to a concept. The concept WORD,
e.g., is instantiated among others by the English word word, whose tokens
have the potential to activate in hearers mental representations of the concept
WORD.13 Since the same holds for many concepts coded by technical terms
of linguistics, it is obvious that any ontology for linguistics has to include a
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meta-language ontology, that is a language ontology for the language that is
used to describe linguistic phenomena (cf. Farrar this vol. and Zaefferer this
vol.).
There are at least two reasons why both explicitly spelled-out language
ontologies and well-defined ontologies for linguistics are urgent desiderata
in current linguistics. First, it is a truism that precise descriptions of linguis-
tic phenomena without precisely defined technical terms are impossible. And
second, only with the help of these tools can linguists reliably compare and
compile different descriptions within a language and across languages. How-
ever, there are still many areas in linguistics that are characterized by confu-
sion and disagreement on the terminology used – to pick just one example,
the area of information structuring with all kinds of uses for words such as
topic or given or background – and therefore it is often far from clear if dif-
ferent authors and schools presuppose different ontologies for linguistics or
if only the labels vary.
Given these circumstances it is to be highly welcomed that projects like
GOLD (‘General Ontology for Linguistic Description’, cf. Farrar this vol.)
or DOLPHen (‘Domain Ontology for Linguistic Phenomena’, cf. Zaefferer
this vol.) are on their way. Quite a few terminological problems that arise in
linguistics are due to a lack of awareness of ontological differences. Consider
sense relations for instance. Sense relations structure the lexicon in that they
reflect conceptual relations that hold between the readings of lexemes. In talk
about sense relations the distinction between conceptual relations and rela-
tions between the corresponding linguistic signs is often blurred or not drawn
at all. Whereas the relation between CAR and CHASSIS is a conceptual one
– a meronomic relation – the corresponding relation between any linguistic
codings of those concepts, e.g. between the English nouns car and chassis,
is a semantic relation – a meronymic one. Another example would be the
hyponymy relation between the English nouns car and vehicle, which holds
because of the conceptual subordination of CAR under VEHICLE. Yet, the role
of the corresponding language ontology is typically left implicit, in that crite-
ria for the sense relations are formulated in terms of linguistic characteristics
or ‘meaning’ (cf. Cruse 1986, for instance, or Schalley 2004: 27–29), but not
in ontological terms.
If meanings are just concepts that happen to be coded by a given meaning-
bearing entity of a given language, for instance a word, then of course mean-
ing relations are just ontological relations. But linguists are rarely aware of
the fact that relations of this kind hold irrespectively of how the related con-
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cepts are coded and irrespectively of whether they are coded (and therefore
meanings) at all. It is as if people would speak of manned space capsule A
being in love with manned space capsule B when what they mean is that the
man aboard A is in love with the woman aboard B.
In summary, it appears that, in order to improve the analysis of linguistic
facts, linguists would need to give yet more attention and weight to the study
of underlying conceptualizations (including their interconceptual relations)
both in the users of their object languages and in themselves as users of the
linguistic metalanguage. This area seems to have the potential for consider-
able progress through explicit and systematic investigation of the language-
ontology interface. The present volume aims to put corresponding current
efforts into a broader context and to instigate a more systematic approach to
ontologies in general, and to language ontologies as well as ontologies for lin-
guistics in particular, by promoting an ontology-driven approach to linguistics
and thus by arguing for and exemplifying what we are calling ontolinguistics.
Given that the construction and maintenance of ontologies by hand be-
comes quickly cumbersome with increasing size, it seems reasonable to con-
sider using corresponding tools from computer science, and therefore the next
section presents an outline of the state of the art in the relevant subsections of
this thriving discipline.
2.3. Ontologies in computer science: A survey
As indicated above, the term ontology is widely used by the computer science
community and there it refers broadly speaking to the construction of infor-
mation models. In computer science an information model is an abstract for-
mal representation of entities that includes their properties and the relations
that hold between them. By contrast with data models, information models
represent their entities without any specification of implementation issues or
protocols for data transportation. Among computer scientists the word on-
tology has received such a broad use that it has been employed to refer to
any information model. It is necessary for the purpose of the following to
constrain that usage. More specifically, we will understand by ontology in
the computer science sense a specification in a formal language of terms and
definitions describing things that make up the world.
A key component of this definition of ontology is the phrase ‘a formal
language’: Different degrees of formality are exhibited by different informa-
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tion modeling languages. Figure 4 presents a set of such modeling languages
along a continuum (excerpted from Ray 2004). We will also briefly describe
them in order to delineate what counts as ontology in computer science.
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Figure 4. Information modeling languages
Terms refers to a controlled and
usually domain specific vocabulary.
‘Ordinary’ Glossaries are terms
with natural language definitions,
as one finds in many textbooks,
Ad hoc Hierarchies such as Yahoo!
are sets of terms with a relation-
ship between terms, but where no
formal semantics for that relation-
ship is defined. Data Dictionaries
are more formal models of informa-
tion, often of relational databases,
where each term and relation has
an associated natural language def-
inition (EDI stands for standard-
ized Electronic Data Interchange).
Since Roget’s pioneering work a
Thesaurus is a word list that is not
ordered alphabetically but accord-
ing to conceptual relations. Struc-
tured Glossaries may include rela-
tionships among the terms in the
glossary. XML DTDs are Docu-
ment Type Definitions in eXten-
sible Markup Language (Yergeau
et al. 2004), used for communica-
tion among software systems. XML
supports nested, or hierarchical in-
formation structures, but is a language for defining syntax that has no asso-
ciated constraints on semantics. Principled Informal Hierarchies are those
which do not have a formal, logical model of relations between terms,
but at least have an informal, common-sense explanation of relationships.
DB Schemas are Data Base structures that have more formal definitions of
the meaning of terms and relations, usually by employing statements in a
database constraint language. XML Schema (with a capital S) is a further
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development of the XML DTD and is now the way to specify XML-based
communication that is recommended by the World Wide Web Consortium.
Formal Taxonomies are those which have a formal, logical semantics for the
relations among terms.
Frames include a range of standard AI languages that have terms, rela-
tions, and inheritance of properties. Examples are the Open Knowledge Base
Connectivity (OKBC) protocol (Chaudhri et al. 1998) and the ontology editor
and knowledge acquisition system Prote´ge´. Data and Process Models couple
taxonomies and defined relationships with a semantics for representing pro-
cess and action. UML, the Unified Modeling Language for specifying the
design of object-oriented systems (Object Management Group 1997–2006,
cf. also Schalley this vol.) and Object-Role Modeling (ORM) exemplify this
kind of information model. Description Logic (Baader et al. 2003) languages
like the DARPA Agent Markup Language (DAML), the Ontology Integration
Language (OIL), and their merger DAML+OIL combine the knowledge rep-
resentation elements of a frame system with the ability to define rules; they
are sublanguages of predicate logic. The expressiveness of rules is limited in
order to ensure that inference on the rules is tractable. KIF, OCL, and OWL re-
fer to three very expressive languages. Knowledge Interchange Format (KIF)
(Genesereth 1991) is a first order logic, for which there have been several
versions that differ in their details. Object Constraint Language (OCL) is part
of UML (see above). The Ontology Web Language (OWL) (McGuiness and
van Harmelen 2004) is a formal logical language, with similar expressive-
ness to KIF, that conforms to XML syntax. It should be noted that there are
languages with far higher expressiveness including modal logic and various
higher-order logics (Nadathur and Miller 1998) that exist further down along
the continuum shown in Figure 4. They present significant challenges for
practical inference however, and to date they have been used primarily for
research in theorem proving rather than specification of ontologies.
It is only models that make use of the full features of the languages in the
bottom of the diagram, from ‘Frames’ onward, that can be called ontologies
in a way consistent with our definition. In order to distinguish ontologies in
computer science (and artificial intelligence) – which are based on a formal
language – from ontologies in a more general sense, we will refer to the
former as ‘formal ontology’ hereafter.
A formal ontology is distinct from the most common instance of a set of
terms and definitions: the dictionary. A dictionary does not employ a formal
language, but rather an informal one: a human natural language. A dictio-
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nary is meant to be read and interpreted by humans. No machine is currently
capable of understanding a dictionary in any realistic sense of the word ‘un-
derstanding’. Furthermore, a dictionary is descriptive. It provides definitions
which are presumably appropriate at a point in time, often with annotations
about the usage of words up to the time of publication. Language evolves
through an organic process and all attempts to render language static, such as
the efforts of the Acade´mie Franc¸aise, have failed and will continue to fail to a
significant degree. In contrast, a formal ontology is prescriptive or normative.
It states definitively what a given term means in a formal language. A term in
an ontology is not a word but a concept, although the concept will normally
be given a name which is a word or combination of words in order to support
human understanding of the ontology. A true formal ontology however could
have all its term names replaced with arbitrary codes and still have the same
formal properties. The only issue would be how such an ontology relates its
terms to linguistic items in order to make its results of processing intelligible
and useful to humans.
One of the issues within the ontolinguistics enterprise is indeed this: how
can relations between ontologies – as they are used in computer science –
and linguistic expressions be established? Although any such relation will be
imperfect, the degree of precision of relation and scope of coverage has been
improving since greater bodies of formal ontologies, lexical resources, and
corpora became available. The most prominent lexical database is WordNet
(Fellbaum 1998), and there are efforts to create similar resources in languages
other than English, often with relation to the English WordNet. Such re-
sources focus on the smallest lexical units, which are usually words, although
multi-word units are also present in small numbers (cf. Fellbaum this vol.).
Collections of larger, phrasal units have been proposed (Pease and Fellbaum
2004) and the collection of lexical functions proposed by Mel’cuk (1998) –
universal relations between lexical items including the standard sense rela-
tions – has been studied. There is significant potential for the ontology com-
munity to make use of work undertaken to catalog closed-class elements of
language. Such elements may be considered to have a significant place in
communication due to their presence as structural features in languages, as
opposed to the elements of the open-class or lexical subsystem (cf. also Talmy
this vol.). A more recent effort to relate a formal ontology to WordNet (Niles
and Pease 2003) is also described in this volume (Pease this vol.).
However, lexical resources and formal ontologies are very different arti-
facts. For instance, over the past few years there have been many publica-
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tions that describe ‘fixes’ to the WordNet taxonomy according to ontological
principles (Gangemi et al. 2002b). Fundamentally, these are misguided, since
language, as an organic system, does not conform to ontological principles.
Once this distinction is recognized, however, there is great value in relating
language to ontology for use in a broad range of applications and research
endeavors. One innovative effort in this volume (Farrar this vol.) makes use
of a formal ontology to describe structural linguistic information itself, an ap-
proach that has been touched on from a linguistic perspective in the previous
section.
There is an important distinction in Formal Ontology (and also Ontology
more generally, as has extensively been discussed in Section 1.) between the
language in which an ontology is expressed and the content or semantics
of the ontology itself. A much larger proportion of effort in the Ontology
community in computer science has gone into the development of languages
as well as tools and methods, compared to the level of effort that has gone
into the creation of content.
One aspect connected to the creation of content is the semantic scope
and degree of generality an ontology exhibits (cf. also the discussion in Sec-
tion 1.). This naturally applies to formal ontologies as well – which are char-
acterizable by whether they cover very general concepts, as in an upper on-
tology, or very specific topics, as in a domain specific ontology. Most extant
formal ontologies pertain to fairly narrow topics or domains (Casati and Varzi
1995; Gru¨ninger and Menzel 2003), although these can be of great interest
and value. The authors are aware of only three formal ontologies that have
attempted to define the broadest and most general notions, which collectively
may be termed an upper ontology. These are the Suggested Upper Merged
Ontology (Niles and Pease 2001), Cyc (Lenat 1995), and DOLCE (Gangemi
et al. 2002a). We should note that the distinction between upper ontology and
domain specific ontology, however, is a continuum without a clear dividing
line. While the relation temporallyBefore is certainly an upper ontology
concept and the class Carburator is certainly a domain specific one, there
are many concepts in between such extremes that do not have such an obvious
membership.
Another way of characterizing formal ontologies is the number of terms
in the ontology. Terms may be classified into, amongst others,
– instances, like KofiAnnan and Germany;
– classes, like Human, and Country;
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– relations, like agentOf and mother;
– function terms, like GovernmentOf and AdditionFunction.
However, a count of terms can only be a meaningful metric as to the size
of an ontology, if the terms counted include significant associated definitions
(through which the terms are sufficiently interrelated).
Yet another metric is the number of axioms, which are indispensable for
inference and expressive power. An axiom is any formal statement. Such
statements may be
– simple ground statements, like ‘Kofi Annan is Secretary General of the
UN’, and ‘Germany is a country’;
– quantified statements, like ‘there exists some farmer who beats his don-
key’;
– rules, like ‘Every good boy loves his mother’.
Note that here we have stated in informal English examples that would be
expressed in a formal language in a formal ontology.
2.4. Ontologies and artificial intelligence
According to a prevalent definition by Luger and Stubblefield (1993), Arti-
ficial Intelligence (AI) is the branch of computer science that is concerned
with the automation of intelligent behavior. Regardless whether this effort is
based on the abstract concept of rationality or involves mimicking the hu-
man mind, any truly intelligent computer system surely requires the capabil-
ity to acquire, process and use knowledge about the domain it is situated in
or concerned with. Whereas until the early 80s, this capability was usually
associated with the presence of some knowledge storage facility and log-
ical reasoning (like in so-called expert systems), nowadays it is no longer
consensus in AI research that information processing demands for an ex-
plicit collection of computational knowledge (a so-called knowledge base),
possibly including some domain conceptualization in form of a formal on-
tology. Approaches in some contemporary AI-subfields such as connection-
ism or situated intelligence usually lack any symbolic knowledge represen-
tation, and certain popular AI methods such as Q-learning get along without
any (explicit) world model. Nevertheless, the presence of a knowledge base
(whether based on logic or another knowledge representation format such as
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Bayesian networks) can strongly increase the flexibility and adaptability of
an intelligent system by virtue of the separation of knowledge collection and
knowledge-based reasoning on the one hand, and planning, searching and
acting capabilities on the other, as pointed out in detail in Section 2.4.1. In
addition, the ability to represent and process information symbolically can be
a prerequisite for the exchange of information with others (see below). Con-
sequently, the majority of AI-frameworks still comprise some kind of more or
less powerful knowledge base, and an increasing number also provides some
facility specifically dedicated to concept knowledge. The latter is the case for
basically the same reasons why ontologies are used in other disciplines and
in “ordinary” computer science too (e.g., to be able to reuse rather general,
abstract and persistent domain theories in different tasks of knowledge pro-
cessing). But in contrast to other areas of computer science, in AI the foci are
on the computational reasoning about/using (ontological) knowledge, on the
(computationally) intelligent acquisition and revision of new knowledge, and
on the computational use of (ontological) knowledge for decision making. In
addition, ontologies in AI are very useful and often inevitable means for the
communication and collaboration of intelligent systems, including the inter-
action of humans with machines and the machine-supported interaction of
humans. In such settings a common informational ground needs to be found
in order to facilitate understanding and cooperation (and even conflicts), and
consented ontologies partially provide this common ground in terms of con-
ceptualizations of the respective common domain. This states a reason for the
eminent importance of ontologies in Distributed AI, a fast-growing subfield
of AI concerned with the interaction of intelligent systems, as described in
detail in Section 2.4.2.
2.4.1. Knowledge bases
The notion of a knowledge base, or a collection of facts and rules, along
with inference procedures to make use of those rules, has a long history in
the field of AI (Pease, Liuzzi, and Gunning 2001). The point of this research
area has been to decouple declaratively specified knowledge from procedural
code, allowing a software system to behave more intelligently, and less me-
chanically, by dynamically combining small chunks of knowledge to reach
an answer. Whereas a conventional software system would have specified a
series of operations to be performed in a certain order, a knowledge base sys-
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tem has a generic inference process that can opportunistically apply a range
of declaratively specified knowledge in order to reach different answers to
different queries.
Knowledge base systems are also called expert systems in part because
this work was primarily undertaken to provide a software-based expert in
some field. One of the earliest expert systems was Mycin (Buchanan and
Shortliffe 1984), which was designed to diagnose infectious blood diseases.
It achieved a level of competence that was better than most human experts.
Notably, despite its competence, it was not put into commercial use because
of social and human factor issues. This, in part, spawned a whole new field
of research to address these ‘soft’ considerations in the successful application
of software systems. Mycin did not originally have a completely clear sep-
aration of knowledge from inference procedures. The Emycin project (van
Melle 1982) was an attempt to make that separation clear by creating a more
general expert system shell that could be used on a more widely varied set
of knowledge. Many companies created and sold expert system shells, some
derived directly from the Emycin work.
As expert system projects proliferated in the 1980s, it became clear that al-
though inference processes could be reused, knowledge often had to be recre-
ated for each new application. The problem was that simplifying assumptions
were often built into the knowledge. These assumptions were invariably ap-
propriate for one domain, but not another. One way of interpreting this larger
issue of assumptions was called the frame problem (McCarthy and Hayes
1969). The real world is large and complex. It is not practical to model ev-
ery feature of the world, especially when a project has a focused goal such
as diagnosing blood diseases. This tension between the need to focus knowl-
edge creation on the task at hand, and to make that knowledge as reusable as
possible, has spawned the Ontology sub-field of AI.
One head-on approach to this problem has been to attempt to encode all
the common sense knowledge of the world (Lenat 1995). More modest efforts
have been to create knowledge that is at a level of generality and reusability
that is simply greater than most applications. Creating such knowledge how-
ever has proven difficult, and there are only three major attempts to create
formal upper level ontologies (cf. above). Most research in this area has fo-
cused on tools such as Prote´ge´ (Eriksson et al. 1999), languages such as KIF
(Genesereth 1991) and OWL (McGuiness and van Harmelen 2004), and pro-
cesses as described in Guarino and Welty (2002), rather than on the knowl-
edge itself.
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2.4.2. Ontologies in distributed AI: Issues and selected approaches
The last few years have seen a tremendous rise of interest in ontologies for the
use in distributed settings with multiple, interacting participants – especially
so-called open environments like the Semantic Web, open multiagent systems
and peer-to-peer systems.
Such environments can be characterized by the following properties,
which might be more or less distinct depending on the concrete application
domain:
– Heterogeneous set of autonomous participants, with only few restrictions
for participation.
The participants operate basically self-interested towards their individual
and often hidden goals. Neither the concrete set of participants nor their
capabilities, beliefs, and intentions are known beforehand.
– The knowledge domain is highly dynamic and heterogeneous.
– Initial and possibly persistent nonexistence of a commonly agreed, sin-
gle ‘truth’ (and thus of ‘knowledge’ in an objectivist sense), absence of a
central instance for the enactment of behavioral and informational norms.
Applications in such environments require a shared domain semantics in
order to support a mutual understanding among the distributed participants.
Computational ontologies constitute a popular response to this need. The use
of ontologies in such settings focuses thus mainly on the enabling of knowl-
edge communication, sharing, and reuse by means of the generation and
provision of a conceptual common ground among the interacting parties. In
this regard, we distinguish two probably overlapping classes of participants,
namely ontology sources and users, both human as well as artificial agents,
but also ‘passive’ ontology sources like web documents.
As stated earlier, ontologies are usually defined as formal representations
of domain conceptualizations, focusing on consented and stable concepts. In
the following, we will describe issues which arise in open environments from
applying this traditional understanding of ontologies, and present selected re-
search efforts in response to these issues. For lack of space, we cannot give an
exhaustive overview of the research field. Rather we would like to provide a
short, concise description of key properties of a relatively small group of for-
mal and technical frameworks, selected from a large list (with often equally
useful other approaches), in order to provide a starting point for further read-
ing.
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2.4.2.1. Issues
While the compilation, integration, and sharing of information among hetero-
geneous information sources and users becomes more and more important, a
large number of contemporary frameworks and tools for the modeling and
usage of ontologies still proceed on the assumption of static, fully consented
and authoritative ontologies. This reflects a sort of dilemma: On the one hand,
ontologies should ease the reuse of knowledge and the sharing of knowledge
among distributed parties, and thus should be stable and agreed, on the other
hand, ontologies (being a special kind of knowledge) are themselves subject
to difficulties known from the field of knowledge sharing, e.g. arising from
controversial viewpoints.
The following problems are considered to be most prominent due to dis-
tributed settings with heterogeneous ontology sources. Further potential is-
sues and examples can be found in Tamma (2002) and Staab and Studer
(2003).
1. Ontology sources operating with mutually incompatible representa-
tion languages. This issue is likely to become less severe in the near fu-
ture, since the standardization of representational aspects progresses rapidly,
mainly driven by the Semantic Web effort. But there still is no consensus
regarding the adequate degree of expressiveness required for a common for-
mal ontology language (taking into account aspects like logical decidability).
This is one reason why the W3C’s description logic based ontology language
OWL (cf. Section 2.3.) comes in three variations – OWL Lite, OWL-DL (the
most often used variant of OWL which is equivalent to a certain prevalent de-
scription logic), and OWL Full – differing in expressiveness, not to mention
languages such as SWRL that extends OWL with the ability to represent rules.
OWL-DL can be considered as the current quasi-standard for the representa-
tion of web ontologies, since it is considerably more expressive than OWL
Lite while corresponding (in contrast to OWL Full) to a decidable variant of
description logic.
2. Homonymy and synonymy. E.g., i) the same name is used for different
concepts (because of context-dependency of the name, for instance, as with
the word wood which denotes both a collection of trees and their material),
or ii) different names are used for the same concept, like car and automobile
(Tamma 2002).
3. Incompatible concept coverage, scopes and modeling granularities:
E.g., i) multiple concept definitions appear to describe the same concepts,
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but overlap only partially in fact (for instance, in one ontology, CHAMPAGNE
might be a sub-class of WINE, in another it is not), or ii) concepts are modeled
in a fine-grained way (i.e., with many sub-classes and/or attributes) in one
ontology, but only coarsely in another (for instance, RED WINE and WHITE
WINE as the only sub-class of WINE vs. CHARDONNAY, CHIANTI, BEAUJO-
LAIS, . . . [Tamma 2002]).
4. Incompatible representation paradigms and top-level concepts. E.g.,
ontology 1 might use the elementary concept EVENT as a top node, whereas
ontology 2 subsumes everything under MATTER.
5. Semantic inconsistencies due to stable goal or belief conflicts of the par-
ticipants. E.g., the first ontology source treats RELIGION as a direct aspect of
CULTURE, whereas the second contains an additional concept SUPERSTITION
which is used to classify RELIGION. While this is an extreme example, one
can easily find further examples from various controversial fields like politics.
6. Communication problems, preventing agreement on and coordination
of ontology sources; unreliable ontology sources.
Whereas some of these issues can be resolved at least in principle (e.g., in-
compatible ontologies could be made compatible just by unifying the names
of certain concepts, as with issue 2 ii) above), some other issues might be
technically very difficult to resolve (e.g., issues 1 and 3), or the dissolution
is impossible on the level of ontology processing at least without dispropor-
tional measures that would lead to severe restrictions on the software applica-
bility. For example, semantically inconsistent definitions of the same concept
might have their origin in divergent world views of the ontology sources (is-
sue 5); an alignment of these world views, establishing an agreement, would –
if practicable at all – lead to a loss in source autonomy and therefore decrease
the flexibility and robustness of the application.
In addition to the possibility that some of the above issues cannot be re-
solved, and the possible undesired loss of ontology source autonomy when
attempting to get rid of them, there are further considerations to be taken into
account when it comes to the integration of ontologies in open environments
which have been largely neglected in traditional approaches to ontology inte-
gration and sharing.
First, stable semantic conflicts are not just something one should get rid
of by any means. Instead, conflict knowledge (Mu¨ller and Dieng 2002) (i.e.,
meta-knowledge about conflicts) can provide valuable information about the
attitudes, world views and goals of the respective knowledge sources. More
generally, a set of distributed ontology sources and users forms a social layer
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consisting of provenance information and information about the social rela-
tionships among ontology contributors and users. The explication and eval-
uation of this layer can provide the knowledge users with valuable meta-
knowledge, and – if made explicit and visible – can be prerequisites for a
subsequent resolution of conflicts regarding controversial knowledge. In this
regard, it is important to bear in mind that subjective intentions and goals do
not just exist for intelligent agents, but also indirectly for other kinds of ontol-
ogy sources (like web documents), simply by virtue of their human creators.
Second, in the absence of normative meaning governance, and due to the
inherently dynamic nature of knowledge in open environments, such mecha-
nisms for ontology integration as filtering, use of trust relationships and most
traditional ways of ontology merging can only provide preliminary decisions
about the reasonable modeling of domains, because within a heterogeneous
group of autonomous ontology sources and users, in the end each user can
only decide for himself about the meaning, relevance and correctness of the
given information, and these decisions might need to be revised in the course
of time.
2.4.2.2. Ontology integration
To integrate data from multiple ontologies, there exist different possibilities,
namely ontology merging, mapping, and matching (Gruber 1993; Tamma
2002; Staab and Studer 2003). Whereas merging describes the process of
creating a new single coherent ontology that includes the information of all
merged ontologies, mapping describes a process where the original ontolo-
gies remain separated, but are made consistent and coherent with each other,
either by finding tuples of related concepts and/or by defining mappings to
relate concepts within the source ontologies. ‘Matching’ in particular deals
with the problem of finding equalities or at least similarities among several
ontologies. The central problem for the process of mapping/matching is to
identify and compare the meaning of the respective concepts. Subsequently,
a merging process can then unite equivalent concept descriptions, and re-
move redundant ones. There exist several clues for this task, e.g., from the
comparison of the concept names to the evaluation and comparison of the
sub-concepts of a concept and their relations.
Even today such processes are still largely conducted by hand, which is
a time-consuming process that often leads to mistakes. Especially the fast
growing number of distributed ontologies in the Semantic Web will therefore
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increase the need for (semi-)automated tools in order to support ontology
integration. There already exist a number of tools – such as, for instance, On-
toMerge (Dou, McDermott, and Qi 2002), OntoMorph (Chalupsky 2000), or
Observer (Mena et al. 2000) – supporting automatic or semi-automatic on-
tology merging or mapping. Their main purpose is to (possibly interactively)
guide the ontology designer through the merging/mapping process, and to
identify inconsistencies or other problems, and to present suggestions for fur-
ther proceeding.
Advanced ontology and knowledge modeling environments which sup-
port multiple users are, e.g., OntoEdit (http://www.ontoknowledge.org/tools/
ontoedit.shtml), Prote´ge´ (Eriksson et al. 1999), and Sigma (Pease 2003).
Analogously, tools exist for the multi-user creation of ontology instances by
means of the manual annotation of documents and other data with ontology-
based meta-data. Of course, such approaches are of limited value if it comes
to the integration of information in large-scale environments like the web.
Software frameworks have been designed in order to support both the expert
development of ontologies and the virtual and/or transformational integration
and dissemination of heterogeneous ontologies and instance knowledge. A
pioneering approach in this regard has been OntoBroker (Decker et al. 1999).
A more recent, ambitious example for such a framework is KAON (Bozsak
et al. 2002), which integrates available resources and provides tools for the
acquisition, engineering, management, and presentation of distributed ontolo-
gies and meta-data.
If agents are involved in integration frameworks, they are often ‘only’ part
of the technical middleware (serving as matchmakers, for instance), rather
than being intelligent ontology sources themselves. One of few exceptions in
this regard is InfoSleuth (Nodine, Fowler, and Perry 1999), where informa-
tion agents provide ontologies that are used as media for the integration of
heterogeneous knowledge contributions. Beside other features, InfoSleuth al-
lows the annotation of knowledge contributions with information about their
provenances and the long-term monitoring of knowledge domains.
One of the most important application fields for distributed compu-
tational ontologies is Organizational Knowledge Management, which ad-
dresses the ontology-supported creation, representation, usage, and distribu-
tion of knowledge within complex organizations, such as (large) companies
or within the government. Most organizational knowledge management sys-
tems still aim for the creation of monolithic, centralized, and homogeneous
knowledge bases for the collection of corporate knowledge, according to a
32 Matthias Nickles et al.
single ontology-based organization schema, in order to enable communica-
tion and knowledge sharing across the organization. An example for an or-
ganizational, agent-based knowledge management framework which in con-
trast explicitly acknowledges the distributed and social nature of knowledge
in large organizations is FRODO (van Elst et al. 2004). FRODO can be char-
acterized as a large-scale meta-knowledge system with ontology-based orga-
nizational structures and support for workflow-based knowledge contexts. It
makes use of social agents for the management of ontologies, workflow, and
personal information assistance in order to relate individuals and organiza-
tional concerns.
2.4.2.3. Ontology emergence and uncertainty
A characteristic of open environments is that knowledge domains are dy-
namic and can often be modeled with some uncertainty. Probabilistic on-
tologies (e.g., Giugno and Lukasiewicz 2002) provide the possibility to de-
scribe concepts and instances with variable degrees of belief, denoting un-
certainty of description logic’s terminological axioms (as opposed to vague-
ness in fuzzy logic). E.g., in a probabilistic ontology, the modeler can assign
the probability 0.3 to the claim that ‘Tomatoes are fruits’. Probabilistic on-
tologies usually build upon description logic, which can be used to describe
assertional knowledge (i.e., about concept instances) also. Besides this, there
are many other approaches for the probabilistic enhancement of knowledge
bases which could in principle be used to model uncertain ontologies also
(e.g., stochastic logic).
The Simple HTML Ontology Extensions (SHOE) (Heflin and Hendler
2000) is a quite fundamental approach to dynamic ontologies, acknowledging
that knowledge on the internet is not static but evolves in time, and that on-
tologies do not exist in monolithic isolation. SHOE provides a formal frame-
work and an ontology-based knowledge representation language intended for
information embedded within web pages (via semantic annotations). It sup-
ports ontology revision as a change in the components of an ontology (i.e.,
the addition or removal of categories and their relationships), and the version-
ing of subsequently revised ontologies. In this regard, formal techniques like
those described before are supported to align and integrate multiple ontolo-
gies.
A wide research field within that of ontology emergence is that of ontology
learning from large unstructured or semi-structured data sets and natural-
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language documents. Concrete techniques trade under names like concept
mining and clustering, and build upon well-explored approaches in the areas
of data mining and natural language processing. Mostly, they are limited to
the automatic generation of taxonomical ontologies or word lists, though.
Since this topic is beyond the scope of this article, we refer the interested
reader to Staab et al. (2002) and Misskof, Navigli, and Velardi (2002) for
details.
Almost all approaches to ontology sharing require an agreement on the
respective concepts. In case such an agreement is not given, a process of
establishing a common ontological ground among the parties has to be exe-
cuted. In case these parties are intelligent software agents, such a process can
be performed automatically: Ontology negotiation (Bailin and Truszkowski
2003) enables intelligent agents to cooperate in performing a task, even if
their domain knowledge is based on different ontologies. Ontology negotia-
tion allows agents to discover ontological conflicts and to establish a com-
mon ground for further communications though incremental mutual requests
and interpretations, clarifications, and explanations regarding concept mean-
ings. For this purpose, practical approaches to ontology negotiation usually
provide an ontology negotiation protocol and a software infrastructure in or-
der to support the negotiation tasks. Within this protocol, certain speech acts
according to the negotiation tasks can be performed by the agents, like ‘Re-
quest Clarification’ (of an unknown concept name) and ‘Confirmation of In-
terpretation’ (of a given concept definition). In the course of the negotiation
process, ideally, the agents come to an agreed categorization that can subse-
quently be used in knowledge-based communication. Due to its high com-
municational overhead it is questionable if this approach can be applied in
the large scale, but it is surely a very flexible way for ontology alignment
in dyadic micro-scenarios. Ontology negotiation acknowledges that different
agents might have different world views that need to be aligned communica-
tively in order to facilitate meaningful further communication. Although this
is a technical process steered by a rather simple protocol, this approach is
somewhat related to that of linguistic ontological mediation (Bateman this
vol.), which contends that besides perception-related ‘world ontologies’ of
commonsense concepts there also exist a ‘linguistic ontology’ domain result-
ing from the construction of ‘reality’ by means of language. It is also related
to the concept of purely socially (i.e., communicatively) constructed open
ontologies (cf. below).
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2.4.2.4. Ontology assessment
Ahead of any acquisition of ontological knowledge from an external source
comes the rating of this knowledge regarding criteria like its credibility. This
is especially important in case a selection is required from a set of inconsistent
ontologies which cannot be integrated, or in case ontologies are found in an
open environment where their providers cannot be trusted per se.
In order to assess the usability of an ontology, ontology-inherent proper-
ties like the containment of a certain category and its topical appropriateness
have to be examined (which is not dealt with here, since it is not specific to
distributed settings), but also external characteristics. The certainly most im-
portant meta-knowledge of such kind is that of the provenance of an ontology
(or a part of it).
The co-presence of syntactically and semantically heterogeneous and even
inconsistent ontological knowledge by virtue of provenance annotations is
supported for instance by the Web Knowledge Base 2 (WebKB-2) (Martin
and Eklund 2001). The WebKB-2 server permits web users to add ontologi-
cal and assertional knowledge to a shared, central base, such that syntactical
and semantic heterogeneity is advocated to permit the comparison and mu-
tual completion of knowledge proposed by heterogeneous ontology sources
and users. The WebKB-2 has been initialized with, among others, WordNet
(Miller 1995; Fellbaum this vol.) and other top-level ontologies in order to
provide initial content and guidance for its users. But the WebKB-2 still needs
to prove its usefulness for real-world application, and currently does not have
significant facilities for the comparison of its ‘inhabiting’, possibly highly
heterogeneous part-ontologies.
Provenance information of ontologies is also provided by Swoogle
(http://swoogle.umbc.edu/), which is an internet search machine specialized
on OWL and RDF encoded formal ontologies and meta-data (RDF, the Re-
source Description Framework, is the currently most widely used language
for the representation of information about resources on the web). It uses the
OntoRank algorithm to rate multiple ontologies containing certain keywords.
OntoRank is basically an adoption of Google’s famous PageRank algorithm.
Starting from provenance information, it is often possible to assign a mea-
sure for the reliability of ontology sources. Trust is a very broad and common
notion in Distributed AI, usually expressing whether some ‘positive’ behavior
can be anticipated, and to which degree. As for ontologies, trust information
can be used to calculate degrees of beliefs in ontological statements (or any
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other kind of claims) from the degree of trust assigned to the sources of these
statements (Richardson, Agrawal, and Domingos 2003). As an alternative to
the assignment of degrees of trust to knowledge sources, trust information
can also be assigned directly to categorial and assertional statements (Fischer
and Nickles 2006), which might allow for a more fine grained, context-aware
trust management.
Although the concept of trust is widely used in knowledge modeling, and
has an intuitive appeal, it should be used with care. Very often, ‘trust’ in a cer-
tain information source is plainly identified with the belief in every statement
from this source, which is surely a much too simple understanding. Another
issue especially in large application scenarios like the Semantic Web is that
an efficient trust-based rating of knowledge would require an existing trust
infrastructure like trust networks (Golbeck, Parsia, and Hendler 2003).
In general, any kind of ranking of information in terms of quality and
credibility comes to its limits in case there is not yet enough information
about trust or recommendations to identify and filter out ‘inappropriate’ or
‘wrong’ contributions, or there does not even exist an abstract concept of
global inappropriateness or correctness at all. An alternative approach con-
trasting the identification and removal of semantic heterogeneity within or
among ontologies is to maintain inconsistencies while integrating them, and
to reify them using meta-knowledge about their provenances, their degrees
of agreement by various knowledge sources, users, and groups (by virtue of
voting on knowledge), and their personal and social contexts. Such open on-
tologies (Froehner, Nickles, and Weiss 2004) account for the fact that in open
environments even ontologies (traditionally assumed to be more ‘objective’
and stable than other kinds of knowledge) are subject to social acceptance or
rejection, and thus need to accommodate possibly divergent preferences and
multiple points of view (e.g., controversial opinions) (Nickles et al. 2005) and
optional mechanisms for the leveled fusion of heterogeneous ontological and
‘ordinary’ knowledge. Therefore, the focus is here not on the emergence of
an agreement on a conceptualization, but on the provision of meta-knowledge
about the personal and social circumstances steering the generation, propaga-
tion and usage of ontological knowledge.
In summary, distributed settings pose various challenges for the acquisi-
tion, representation, and usage of ontologies, caused by factors like informa-
tion source autonomy, information heterogeneity, and the possible absence
of commonly agreed conceptual knowledge in such settings. Approaches to
computational ontologies need to address potential problems arising from
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these factors, like inconsistent and un-trustable information, in order to be
useful in open environments like the Semantic Web. Some common research
approaches to the described issues have been outlined in this section. Very re-
cent developments in the research of ontologies for open environments inves-
tigate meta-modeling as a technique to allow context-sensitivity of concept
specifications (Motik 2005) (in the tradition of higher-order logic and context
logic [McCarthy 1987]), a logic for the representation of possibly disagreeing
opinions and other public attitudes (Fischer and Nickles 2006), and reason-
ing with inconsistent ontologies (Huang, van Harmelen, and ten Teije 2005).
Some of these techniques have been known in Artificial Intelligence for quite
a long time, but their practical use in very large and complex environments
like the Semantic Web requires major adaptations, e.g. to ensure logic decid-
ability.
Notes
1. The full frontispiece reads OGDOAS SCHOLASTICA CONTINENS Diagraphen Typi-
cam Artium: Grammatices (Latinae. Graecae.) Logices. Rhetorices. Astronomices.
Ethices. Physices. Metaphysices, seu Ontologiae. Ex Praestantium hujus temporis vi-
rorum lucubrationibus, Pro Doctrinae & virtutum studiosa juventute: CONFECTA; Ia-
cobo Lorhardo, Gymnasij Sangallensis Rectore, & in Ecclesia Christi servo: APUD
GEORGIUM STRAUB Sangalli: ANNO. 1606. It is reproduced on Raul Coraz-
zon’s deservedly award-winning website Ontology. A resource guide for philosophers
(http://www.formalontology.it).
2. It seems that John McCarthy is to be credited not only for inventing the term ‘Artificial
Intelligence’ (on the occasion of the Dartmouth conference 1955), but also for introducing
en passant the term ‘ontology’ in AI when he wrote in the context of a discussion of the
Missionaries and Cannibals puzzle: “Using circumscription requires that common sense
knowledge be expressed in a form that says a boat can be used to cross rivers unless there
is something that prevents its use. In particular, it looks like we must introduce into our
ontology (the things that exist) a category that includes something wrong with a boat or a
category that includes something that may prevent its use.” (McCarthy 1980: 33–34)
3. One cannot exclude, however, that such a second metonymic extension will occur in the
near future. Compare the analogously structured noun psychology, which already has all
three readings. The main entry of the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (http://www.m-
w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=psychology&x=21&y=16) reflects this,
although in a somewhat unsystematic way: “1 : the science of mind and behavior 2 a :
the mental or behavioral characteristics of an individual or group b : the study of mind and
behavior in relation to a particular field of knowledge or activity 3 : a treatise on psychol-
ogy”. 2 a is the object-level reading, 3 is the meta-level reading, and 1 and 2 b represent
the original meta-meta-level reading.
4. This is why publications like “Evaluating Ontological Decisions with OntoClean” (Guarino
and Welty 2002) with the nice subtitle “Explosing [sic! Presumably: exploring] common
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misuses of the subsumption relationship and the formal basis for why they are wrong” are
so important for the field.
5. Cf. also Zaefferer, this vol.
6. Namely the thoughts or perceptions of those who enact the institution. The fact that (a)
only the thoughts or perceptions of the institution-enacting agents, and (b) not even all of
their thoughts and perceptions but only some of them are relevant for the existence of the
institution in question, points to a possible revision of the notion of realism that obviates the
recourse to partial non-realism even for the case of an observer who essentially co-enacts
a given (for instance two-person) institution: If we redefine realism as the thesis that the
objects, properties and relations the world contains exist independently of an observer’s
reflecting thoughts about or perceptions of them, then I can be a realist for instance about
money if I reflectingly think that this is just a disk-shaped piece of metal, but at the same
time pragmatically think that this is a quarter and use it for payment, thereby enacting the
institution of money.
7. Note that the absence of commonly agreed knowledge in the objectivist sense ascribed in
Section 2.4.2. of this article to open environments like the Semantic Web does not imply a
non-realist position, it rather characterizes an epistemological situation.
8. The point of the experiment is that as a side-effect of their specific ontology (there is no cat-
egory for ‘obstacle ahead’) the Didabots clean an area cluttered with Styrofoam blocks by
pushing them into clusters (Pfeifer 2000: 3), illustrating thus that an extremely simple con-
figuration can result in complex (and useful) behavior, but this aspect cannot be elaborated
on in our context.
9. Or more precisely a cell and anatomy ontology of this roundworm (Lee and Sternberg
2003). An excerpt from the abstract: “We are endowed with a rich knowledge about
Caenorhabditis elegans. . . . To make the information more accessible to sophisticated
queries and automated retrieval systems, WormBase has begun to construct a C. elegans
cell and anatomy ontology.”
10. It does of course make sense to compile a corresponding database. But exactly such
a database would nicely illustrate the difference between an ontological (and therefore
generic) database, and a database for a specific entity token. Cf., e.g., Nirenburg and Raskin
(2001: 15–16): “The following components in an agent’s model are relevant for its language
processing ability: . . .
Knowledge about the world, which we find useful to subdivide into:
– an ontology, which contains knowledge about types of things (objects, processes, prop-
erties, intentions) in the world; and
– a fact database, an episodic memory module containing knowledge about instances (to-
kens) of the above types and about their combinations”.
11. “The success of a categorization can be measured by the degrees of prediction and con-
trol which the categories produced afford other scientists. Good theories are built upon
successful categorizations of nature.” (Koepsell 1999: 217)
12. In the context of a talk given at the University of Munich on July 18, 1983, entitled A
Chapter of English Metaphysics, according to the notes taken by Dietmar Zaefferer.
13. It is of course a simplification to speak of the concept of WORD, since there are several con-
cepts we could refer to in this way, both in everyday language and in linguistic terminology,
but for the present purposes these differences do not matter.
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